The Intended Role of the Senate in Supreme Court Appointments by Gauch, James E.
The Intended Role of the Senate in
Supreme Court Appointments
James E. Gaucht
He was nominated for the Supreme Court by a popular Presi-
dent. Despite his experience in the federal judiciary, his nomina-
tion stirred controversy and national debate. The nominee's politi-
cal views, which many considered extreme or objectionable,
became a focus of the battle over his confirmation. The media at-
tacked the nominee in what his supporters considered a concerted
campaign of distortion. Opponents made political attacks, thinly
disguised as questions about the nominee's fitness. Finally, the
vote in the Senate broke down largely along partisan lines. Thus
the Senate rejected John Rutledge for Chief Justice of the Su-
preme Court in 1795.1
The Senate's authority to reject Rutledge, and 28 nominees
2since, comes from the Appointments Clause of the Constitution,
which states: "[The President] shall nominate, and, by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint... Judges of
the supreme Court."' Although many decried the injection of poli-
tics into Robert Bork's nomination and rejection in 1987, political
attacks on judicial nominees are nothing new; "nominations to the
Supreme Court in the 18th and 19th centuries were expected to be
subject to politically motivated attacks."' During the nineteenth
century the Senate rejected one out of every four nominees for the
Supreme Court, often on strictly partisan grounds.' Of six Su-
preme Court nominations that President John Tyler sent to the
Senate in 1844, only one was approved. The Senate rejected or
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ris, The Advice and Consent of the Senate: A Study of the Confirmation of Appointments
by the United States Senate 302-03 (Greenwood, 1968).
The University of Chicago Law Review
postponed the other five, largely because supporters of Henry Clay
incorrectly anticipated that he would win the Presidency in 1844.
This kind of delaying tactic was common in the nineteenth cen-
tury.' A lack of qualifications caused few of the rejections.7 The
influential journalist Horace Greeley once stated that he would op-
pose a particular choice even if he had all the virtues of Marshall
and Story together.' Yet, the Senate has rejected only five nomina-
tions in this century,9 which helps explain why many considered
Bork's rejection illegitimate.
Throughout American history, a number of politicians have
argued for a limited Senate role in the judicial appointments pro-
cess. George Cabot, upon leaving the Senate in 1799, expressed this
view:
I have always rejected the idea of non-concurrence with a
nomination merely because the nominee was less suitable for
office than thousands of others: he must be positively unfit for
the office, and the public duty not likely to be performed by
him, to justify in my mind the non-concurrence."0
In 1970, Richard Nixon argued that it was his constitutional pre-
rogative, as President, to place persons of his own political and ide-
ological persuasion on the Supreme Court.1" The views of such
people as Cabot and Nixon suggest that the Senate must look only
at the basic qualifications, and not at the ideological views of the
nominees. Recently, Senator Peter Domenici echoed this view by
contending that the Framers rejected appointment by the Senate
precisely out of fear "that partisan concerns would overshadow a
candidate's merits. 2
Despite these views, the Senate recently rejected Robert Bork,
whom even opponents admitted had outstanding academic creden-
tials. While Senator Domenici and others have drawn conclusions
from the actions of the Framers in Philadelphia, their conclusions
I Abraham, Justices and Presidents at 40 (cited in note 2).
7 Harris, Advice and Consent at 303 (cited in note 5).
8 John P. Frank, The Appointment of Supreme Court Justices: Prestige, Principles
and Politics, 1941 Wis L Rev 172, 178 n 18, citing William N. Brigance, Jeremiah Sullivan
Black 113 (Pennsylvania Press, 1934).
9 Abraham, Justice and Presidents at 39 (cited in note 2). Robert Bork was the fifth to
be rejected in this century.
"o Harris, Advice and Consent at 44 (cited in note 5) (emphasis in original) .
x1 Letter of Richard M. Nixon to Sen. William Saxbe (March 31, 1970), in 116 Cong
Rec 10158 (April 2, 1970).
17 Senator Peter Domenici, 100th Cong, 1st Sess, in 133 Cong Rec S14914 (Oct 23,
1987).
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have not been based on a comprehensive study of what the Fram-
ers and other leaders at the time said about the Advice and Con-
sent Clause and the role of the Senate in the appointment of Su-
preme Court Justices. 13 Given the debate on the meaning of the
clause and the controversy surrounding the Bork nomination, such
a study is needed. Justice Brennan has complained that pleas for
adherence to original intent are frequently accompanied by a lack
of knowledge of the historical record.14 This comment aims to pro-
vide that knowledge.1 5
The text of the Appointments Clause is ambiguous. The only
express limitation on the Senate's power is that it does not extend
to the nomination itself. The grammatical structure of the clause
separates the Senate's review from the President's nomination; the
phrase "[b]y and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate"
modifies "appoint," but is separated from "nominate." This sug-
gests that the power of nomination belongs to the President alone.
Even some advocates of a rigorous Senate review have conceded
that the power to choose the nominee belongs exclusively to the
President.16
George Mason, a delegate to the constitutional convention of
1787, reasoned from the text that "[t]he Word 'Advice' [here]
clearly relates in the Judgment of the Senate on the Expediency or
1" For an excellent review of the origins of the Appointments Clause which nevertheless
draws no conclusions as to the intended role of the Senate, see Theodore Y. Blumoff, Sepa-
ration of Powers and the Origins of the Appointment Clause, 37 Syracuse L Rev 1037
(1987).
4 William J. Brennan, Jr., Address to the Text and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown
U (Oct 12, 1985), reprinted in The Federalist Society, The Great Debate: Interpreting Our
Written Constitution 11, 15 (1986).
"5 The lack of any transcript from the convention hinders this task. The Journal of the
Convention contains little more than the minutes and a record of the votes taken. Max
Farrand, ed, 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 xi-xii (Yale, 2d ed 1937)
("Farrand"). Of the notes taken by delegates, James Madison's are by far the most accurate
and complete. Many of the delegates regarded him as a "semi-official reporter" and so pro-
vided him with copies of their speeches and motions. 1 Farrand at xvi.
The limitations of these records may always leave the Framers' intent ambiguous. See
James H. Huston, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary
Record, 65 Tex L Rev 1, 2-38 (1986). Nevertheless, this ambiguity no more precludes at-
tempts to discover the intentions behind the Constitution than ambiguity precludes at-
tempts to discern the intent behind wills, contracts, and statutes. See Michael W. McCon-
nell, On Reading the Constitution, 73 Cornell L Rev 359, 361 (1988).
" See, for example, Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., Advice and Consent: The Role
of the United States Senate in the Judicial Selection Process, 54 U Chi L Rev 200, 202
(1987). But compare Luis Kutner, Advice and Dissent: Due Process of the Senate, 23
DePaul L Rev 658, 666 (1974) (contending that the Constitution contemplates that the
President will consult with the Senate before making a nomination).
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Inexpediency of the Measure, or Appointment .... ,17 Similarly,
Professor Charles Black has argued that while "consent" could de-
note a perfunctory task, "Advice" requires a comprehensive review
because one could not be a good advisor without considering all the
factors."8
The problem with this interpretation is that while "Advice"
connotes a non-binding interchange, the consent requirement,
manifested in the confirmation vote, is binding. If the Senate does
not consent, the President and the country are bound by the rejec-
tion. Thus a preliminary question is raised as to whether advice
and consent are to be taken together, so that "consent" makes the
advice binding. If consenting is a separable act from advising, the
scope of Senatorial "advice" bears no necessary relation to the
binding act of consent. 9 Strict textual interpretation also ignores
different policy considerations that might apply to judicial but not
to executive branch appointees.20 These problems illustrate the
limitations of interpreting "advice and consent" based on the text
alone. Therefore, this comment focuses on the historical record in
order to shed light on how the text should be interpreted.
Section I analyzes the primary concerns of the Framers at the
convention and in the ratification debates. Section II discusses the
advice and consent plan in light of these concerns and from that*
discussion draws conclusions about the original limits on Senato-
rial power to review Supreme Court nominees. Section III tests
those conclusions by examining the Senate's rejection of John Rut-
ledge in 1795, when the Framers and their contemporaries occu-
pied the Senate. Finally, Section IV considers the implications of
the Framers' intentions for the modern Court and the appointment
process.
The comment concludes that although the debates in the con-
vention focused primarily on the dangers of political corruption
and patronage, the Framers were also motivated by concerns for
their states' political and economic interests. The Framers con-
sciously divided the power between the Senate and the President
in order to protect the interests of all the states and to avoid polit-
17 Letter of George Mason to James Monroe (Jan 30, 1792), in Philip B. Kurland &
Ralph Lerner, eds, 4 The Founders' Constitution 111 (Chicago, 1987).
"' Charles L. Black, Jr., A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nomi-
nations, 79 Yale L J 657, 658-659 (1970). See also Mathias, 54 U Chi L Rev at 202-203 (cited
in note 17) (discussing possibilities for meaningful senatorial advice).
19 E. Edward Bruce, "Advice and Consent" In Selecting Judges Has Its Limitations,
10 Legal Times 12 (Aug 24, 1987).
20 Richard D. Friedman, Balance Favoring Restraint, 9 Cardozo L Rev 15, 15 (1987).
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ical abuse of the appointment power. Thus, if we are to achieve the
ends the Framers desired, the Senate must play an active role in
considering not only the basic qualifications of the nominee, but
any factors that it deems important. This may occasionally lead
the Senate to reject a nominee on what some might consider unfair
political grounds, but the Framers fully expected nominations to
be played out in the political arena. Their hope was that, on bal-
ance, the process would yield good appointments.
I. THE CONVENTION
A. Background
Any analysis of the intent behind "advice and consent" is
complicated by the divergent appointment schemes considered by
the delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787.21 The Vir-
ginia Plan, which provided an early framework for the new consti-
tution, left appointment of judges to the national legislature.22
Supporters of this plan soon shifted to James Madison's proposal
that the Senate, rather than the entire legislature, should appoint
judges.23 James Wilson and others strongly opposed both of these
systems and instead proposed that the executive appoint judges.24
The idea of an appointment power shared between the Presi-
dent and the Senate emerged early in the Convention. On June 5,
Alexander Hamilton informally suggested that the Senate have the
right of "rejecting or approving" the President's choices.2 5 Nathan-
iel Gorham proposed the "advice and consent" arrangement on
July 18, but a tied vote among the states defeated the proposal.26
Earlier the same day the Convention had rejected appointment by
the President alone by a 6-2 vote. Three days later it rejected a
plan that gave the Senate a veto over the President's judicial ap-
pointments, and voted to give the Senate exclusive power to ap-
point judges.28
Through the summer, the draft of the Constitution retained
21 For background on the Constitutional Convention, see Julius Goebel, Jr., 1 History
of the Supreme Court of the United States 198-202 (MacMillan, 1971).
2 1 Farrand at 21 (cited in note 15).
23 Id at 120, 232-33.
2, Id at 119, 126. William Paterson also proposed appointment by the executive. Id at
244.
25 Id at 128.
28 2 Farrand at 38, 44. Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Virginia voted yes;
Connecticut, Delaware, North Carolina and South Carolina voted no.
27 Id at 44.
28 Id at 72, 83.
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appointment by the Senate. In late August, however, the Conven-
tion submitted the Appointments Clause, along with other dis-
puted provisions, to the Committee of Eleven. 9 On September 4,
the Appointments Clause that emerged from the Committee of
Eleven had been changed again and contained the familiar advice
and consent provision.30 The convention as a whole approved the
clause without dissent on September 7, just ten days before it
passed the new Constitution.31 George Mason later complained to
Thomas Jefferson about "the precipitate, & intemperate, not to
say indecent Manner, in which business was conducted, during the
last Week of the Convention .... 32 The atmosphere of the last
days of the Convention may very well have influenced the sudden
compromise.
B. The Delegates' Concerns
In debating the various appointment schemes, the delegates
focused on three issues: (1) the ability to evaluate the qualifica-
tions of potential nominees; (2) corruption and intrigue; and (3)
state interests.
1. Qualifications.
The delegates to the convention devoted surprisingly little
time to discussing the characteristics that they wished Justices of
the Supreme Court to have. Instead, most of the debate focused on
who-the Senate or the President-would be better able to evalu-
ate candidates. The records of the convention reveal only a re-
quirement of the most basic qualifications for judges. Ellsworth
mentioned that they should possess "a systematic and accurate
knowledge of the Laws" as well as information on "the law of Na-
tions."' 3 Madison noted that "[t]he Legislative talents . . .were
19 Id at 473. The committee consisted of one delegate from each state at the conven-
tion. Its members were: Abraham Baldwin (Georgia), David Brearley (New Jersey), Pierce
Butler (South Carolina), Daniel Carroll (Maryland), John Dickinson (Delaware), Nicholas
Gilman (New Hampshire), Rufus King (Massachusetts), James Madison (Virginia),
Gouverneur Morris (Pennsylvania), Roger Sherman (Connecticut), Hugh Williamson (North
Carolina).
30 Id at 495.
31 Id at 539.
32 John P. Kaminski and Gaspare J. Saladino, eds, 13 The Documentary History of the
Ratification of the Constitution 346 (Historical Society of Wis, 1981). See also Goebel, 1
Supreme Court at 244 (cited in note 25) (describing the atmosphere of the final days as
"supercharged with discontent").
33 2 Farrand at 73-74 (cited in note 15).
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very different from those of a Judge ....- 3 Possibly believing that
such qualifications would be obvious to his fellow delegates and
future leaders, Madison did not elaborate on what any of these tal-
ents were. For the most part, the delegates spoke only in vague
terms about the qualities that candidates for judicial office should
possess.
Nevertheless, the debate over which branch of government
would be better able to evaluate these vague qualifications sparked
a genuine controversy. Discussion focused on whether the Senate
or the President would have better information about the quality
of candidates. The delegates favoring Senate appointment of
judges argued that the Senate would. These arguments appear to
have been no more than bald assertions that the Senate would be
more familiar with the qualifications of the candidates.3 5 Appar-
ently, the underlying logic was that the President would lack this
information because his work would be concentrated in the Capi-
tal, while the senators would have access to such information
through contacts with their home states.36
Those who came to support a mixed appointment power split
on this issue. In the first Congress, Madison stated that the pri-
mary reason behind senatorial participation in the appointments
process was the senators' better acquaintance with the characters
of the candidates.3 7 However, some delegates reasoned that the
President, with contacts throughout the country, would have supe-
rior access to information.3
2. Intrigue and corruption.
The most frequently articulated concern in the appointment
debates was corruption. Supporters of nearly every plan charged
that the other plans would result in political dealing, patronage,
favoritism, and intrigue. While these attacks were most frequently
directed against plans that gave appointment power to one branch
alone, the advice and consent plan also came under attack.
The opponents of Senate appointment argued that a large
group such as the Senate would be more susceptible to the pres-
sures of political patronage and favoritism. Nathaniel Gorham, the
sponsor of the advice and consent system, forecast that giving the
31 1 Farrand at 120.
31 2 Farrand at 41, 43, 81, 82 (Martin, Sherman, Pinckney and Gerry).
316 Id at 81 (Ellsworth).
31 3 Farrand at 357.
" Id at 82 (G. Morris).
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appointment power to a body such as the Senate would "give full
play to intrigue & cabal."3 9 The charges of "intrigue" appear fre-
quently in Madison's notes. Delegates often expressed their worry
about the personal political considerations that could motivate leg-
islators' choices: Madison warned that the legislature might
"hide . . . selfish motives" in its numbers; Wilson spoke of "in-
trigue, partiality, and concealment;" and Edmund Randolph feared
"personal regard" would govern the body's choices.40
To John Adams, who corresponded with the Convention from
England, and to Alexander Hamilton, intrigue included favoritism
and bargaining for votes.4 The fear of intrigue derived in part
from the experiences of the Framers in the Articles of Confedera-
tion Congress,42 as well as their experiences in the states. Gorham
pointed to the "wickedness" of cabal under Rhode Island's ap-
pointments by the legislature. 43 James Madison acknowledged that
the legislature as a whole could be partial to its members: "The
candidate who was present, who had displayed a talent for busi-
ness in the legislative field, who had perhaps assisted ignorant
members in business of their own, or of their Constituents, or used
other winning means, would without any of the essential qualifica-
tions for an expositor of the laws prevail .... ."" However, he be-
lieved that the Senate, being smaller and more stable and indepen-
dent, would be above such self-interested partiality."
On the other hand, many delegates argued that the President
would be more vulnerable to political pressures than the Senate.
They reasoned that it is easier to corrupt one person than many. 6
Several delegates also argued that giving complete power of ap-
pointment to the President would make him too powerful and
king-like.47 George Mason warned of the improper influence the
President could exert over the judiciary if he was involved in
39 Id at 42. See also 1 Farrand at 119, 120 (Wilson, Madison); 2 Farrand at 81, 389
(Randolph, G. Morris).
40 2 Farrand at 80 (Madison); 1 Farrand at 119 (Wilson); 2 Farrand at 81 (Randolph).
41 Letter of John Adams to Roger Sherman (July 20, 1789), in 4 The Founders' Consti-
tution at 107 (cited in note 17); Federalist 76 (Hamilton) in Benjamin Fletcher Wright, ed,
The Federalist 480-81 (Harvard, 1961).
41 2 Farrand at 539 (G. Morris) (cited in note 15).
43 Id at 42.
1, 1 Farrand at 232-233.
45 Id at 120, 233. See also, Jack N. Rakove, The Madisonian Moment, 55 U Chi L Rev
473, 482 (1988) (discussing Madison's vision of a Senate free from political pressures).
46 2 Farrand at 43 (Sherman).
47 1 Farrand at 119 (Rutledge); 2 Farrand at 81 (Ellsworth).
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appointments.48
The shared responsibility notion incorporated in the advice
and consent system was not immune from accusations of intrigue
and corruption either. Expanding on the prospect of intrigue and
corruption raised at the Convention, Adams forecast that Senators
would want to get their allies appointed, and the resultant political
dealing would lead to "corruption of the grossest kinds. ' 49 In addi-
tion, Adams felt that a "check" on the President was troublesome.
If the power to reject a nominee was not used, then there would be
no reason to have it. It would only open the Senate up to censure
from the people for not using it. If, on the other hand, Senators
rejected a candidate, they would expose themselves to the resent-
ment of the President and his friends, who would hold most of the
offices in government.50 Despite the frequency with which the dele-
gates raised the issue, the fear of intrigue in the nomination pro-
cess was not completely sincere. During the debate on the method
of electing the President, George Mason noted the inconsistency of
some of the arguments: "At one moment we are told that the Leg-
islature is entitled to thorough confidence, and to indefinite power.
At another, that it will be governed by intrigue & cabal, and can-
not be trusted at all."'" John Randolph was one delegate who was
clearly guilty of such inconsistency during the debates over judicial
appointments. On July 18, Randolph, who had strongly supported
appointment by the legislature, argued that recording the votes
would give the Senate responsibility and contended that the execu-
tive would be more vulnerable to intrigue.5 2 Three days later, how-
ever, when he shifted his support to the advice and consent pro-
posal, Randolph "laid great stress on the responsibility of the
Executive as a security for fit appointments. Appointments by the
Legislatures have generally resulted from cabal, from personal re-
gard, or some other consideration than a title derived from proper
qualifications."53 It is unlikely that Randolph suddenly realized
that appointment by the legislature or the Senate, which he had
48 2 Farrand at 83. Madison's notes do not indicate what sort of influence concerned
Mason.
11 4 The Founders' Constitution at 107 (cited in note 17). It is important to note that
Adams was a vigorous opponent of the advice and consent system. Thus, he would likely
exaggerate the dangers of the system in order to discourage its adoption.
50 Id. However, even if the Senate were subject to resentment, this may not outweigh
the need to check Presidential power.
51 2 Farrand at 31 (cited in note 15).
52 Id at 43.
51 Id at 81.
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supported since submitting the Virginia Plan nearly two months
before, had problems. His change of heart can be explained, how-
ever, if one looks at the state rivalry controversy that pervaded the
Convention and the Appointments Clause debates.
2. State interests.
Delegates from the smaller states came to Philadelphia wary
that the large states might use the convention's proposals to op-
press and dominate them. On June 27 and 28, Luther Martin de-
livered a speech of more than three hours in which he stressed that
the federal government must serve the states, rather than govern
individuals, and that the three largest states, with the help of only
one other, could make themselves "compleat masters of the rest." '54
The state rivalries arose not so much from state pride as from size
and regional interests.
The Great Compromise, which gave all states equal represen-
tation in the Senate, brought the issue to a head and threatened to
end the convention. On July 16, the convention approved, five
states to four, equal representation for each state in the Senate."
This produced a backlash among the large states. Randolph, from
Virginia, objected to the compromise because all the powers in the
draft Constitution were based on proportional representation in
both houses. He therefore "wished the Convention might adjourn
[until tomorrow], that the large States might consider the steps
proper to be taken in the present solemn crisis of the business, and
that the small States might also deliberate on the means of concili-
ation."56 Many of the delegates from larger states met the follow-
ing morning to discuss their course of action.5"
Ultimately the large states accepted equal representation for
each state in the Senate, but even after the apportionment de-
" 1 Farrand at 437-438, 444-445. Contrast id at 494-495 (Wilson discounting the con-
cerns of small states and arguing for proportional representation).
Il 2 Farrand at 13-15 (cited in note 15). Virginia and Pennsylvania were joined by
South Carolina and Georgia in opposition; Massachusetts was divided. Equal suffrage was a
major portion of the resolution, but other provisions, such as the apportionment of seats in
the House, may have affected the voting. Further, delegates from South Carolina and Geor-
gia may have joined the large states in the belief that the southern states would soon be
among the most populous. Robert Rutland, et al, eds, 12 The Papers of James Madison 379
(U Va, 1977); 1 Farrand at 604-605. See also Drew P. McCoy, James Madison and the
Vision of American Nationality in the Confederation Period: A Regional Perspective, in
Richard Beeman, et al, eds, Beyond Confederation 226, 228 (U NC, 1987).
56 2 Farrand at 17-18. Virginia, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania were generally consid-
ered "large" states, and the others "small" states. See 1 Farrand at 177, 438.
"' 2 Farrand at 19-20.
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bates, the small states' fears remained. As Calvin Jillson has
reported:
The small states continuously eyed the larger states for signs
that they were attempting to construct a system that bene-
fited them inordinately, while the large states were under a
constant temptation to do precisely that. 8
These interstate concerns pervaded the debates on the Appoint-
ments Clause. It is such concerns, and to a lesser extent fears of
corruption, that reveal the intent behind the Advice and Consent
Clause.
II. THE INTENDED MEANING OF ADVICE AND CONSENT
Against this backdrop of fears of corruption and state rivalry,
we can draw several conclusions about how the Framers intended
the advice and consent system to operate. The advice and consent
plan emerged as a compromise incorporating what were seen as the
principal advantages of each of the other major plans: the personal
responsibility of appointment by the President and the security of
appointment by the Senate. The concern over personal responsibil-
ity for bad choices accounts for placing the nomination power in
the President's hands alone. The concern over unchecked favorit-
ism by the President accounts for the Senate's participation and
suggests that the Senate must at least go beyond basic qualifica-
tions to consider the President's motivation for nominating this
particular nominee. Lastly, as discussed below, the role of state ri-
valry suggests that the Framers intended a wide open and largely
unrestricted political evaluation of the nominee. This section first
examines the part state rivalry played in the acceptance of the ad-
vice and consent system, then discusses the theory behind dividing
the appointment power between the President and the Senate, and
lastly considers how far the Senate's review is to extend.
A. Advice and Consent and State Rivalry
The Supreme Court has stated that the advice and consent
system gave the Senate a role in order to prevent the President
from making too many appointments from the larger states. 59 It
based this conclusion on statements to that effect made by Roger
" Calvin C. Jillson, Constitution Making: Conflict and Consensus in the Federal Con-
vention of 1787 152 (Agathon, 1988).
" Myers v United States, 272 US 52, 119-20 (1926).
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Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth in the Connecticut ratification de-
bates.6 0 Professor Joseph Harris rejects this state rivalry view as an
"afterargument" constructed to defend the Constitution, rather
than a major influence at the Convention. He believes that the sys-
tem eventually adopted was a compromise between delegates that
favored and those that feared a strong executive.6 While Professor
Harris correctly observes that delegates from both large and small
states were on both sides of the issue, his conclusion ignores the
role state rivalry played in the Convention in general and in the
appointments debates in particular. Furthermore, the records of
the convention show Madison arguing that the shared appointment
power would better balance the interests of large and small
states.2 Thus, state rivalry could not have been merely an
afterthought.
The theory that state interests played a large role in the adop-
tion of the advice and consent plan finds support in the voting pat-
terns on the appointment proposals in the July debates. Because
votes at the convention were conducted by state, one can see that
the votes did break down along lines between large and small
states, even though individual delegates from those states were on
both sides of the issue. On July 18, two days after the Great Com-
promise, the convention soundly rejected appointment by the
President alone, with only Massachusetts and Pennsylvania voting
in favor of the proposal. 3 Those states were joined by Virginia and
Maryland in supporting Gorham's advice and consent motion, but
the motion failed by a tied vote. 4 By July 21, the battle lines were
more clearly drawn. The convention rejected Madison's proposal of
appointment by the President unless vetoed by a majority of the
Senate, which was essentially equivalent to advice and consent in
terms of smaller state interests; Virginia, Massachusetts and Penn-
sylvania voted yes, and six smaller states voted no.6 5 Appointment
solely by the Senate, in which the smaller states would have rela-
tively more power than in the executive branch, was approved with
the three largest states voting no, and the six remaining voting
yes.66
Explicit evidence of the role that state rivalry and the Great
'0 Id, citing 3 Farrand at 99.
61 Harris, Advice and Consent at 26 (cited in note 5).
62 2 Farrand at 80-81 (cited in note 15).
63 Id at 44.
64 Id.
65 Id at 71-72, 83.
66 Id at 72.
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Compromise played in the Appointments Clause debates can also
be found in the statements of various Framers. Madison recog-
nized that:
[A]s the [Senate] was very differently constituted when the
appointment of the Judges was formerly referred to it, and
was now to be composed of equal votes from all the States,
the principle of compromise which had prevailed in other in-
stances required in this that [there] shd. be a concurrence of
two authorities, in one of which the people, in the other the
states, should be represented.6
Delaware's Bedford acknowledged the danger that if the appoint-
ment power was left to the executive, "[i]t would put it in his
power to gain over the larger States, by gratifying them with a
preference of their Citizens. ' 68 Later, in the Connecticut ratifica-
tion debates, Oliver Ellsworth noted that the Compromise insured
smaller state participation in the appointments process.6 9
A rift between North and South may also have motivated the
advice and consent plan. Madison suggested that the reduced Sen-
ate participation in the advice and consent plan would prevent the
northern states from dominating the South.70 This may have been
rhetoric aimed at persuading the smaller southern states to break
with the other small states and oppose Senate nomination out of
fear of domination by the North on slavery issues. Ironically, given
the judicial battles over slavery in the 1800's, a fellow Virginian,
Mason, rebuffed Madison's line of reasoning. He could "not see
that [the varying interests of North and South] had any connec-
tion with the Judiciary department."'1
The voting patterns and the recorded notes from the period
thus reinforce the claim that the Great Compromise influenced the
adoption of the Advice and Consent Clause. As mentioned, Ed-
mund Randolph is one delegate who probably changed his position
based on equal state representation in the Senate. He tentatively
stuck to his support of appointment by the Senate right after the
Compromise: "It is true that when the appt. of the Judges was
vested in the 2d. branch an equality of votes had not yet been
given to it. Yet he had rather leave the appointmt. there than give
67 Id at 80-81.
68 Id at 43.
" 3 Farrand at 99.
7* 2 Farrand at 81.
71 Id at 83.
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it to the Executive. 7 2 Three days later, however, he spoke in favor
of Gorham's advice and consent proposal and against Senate ap-
pointment.7 3 Such a rapid change of position, by one who favored
legislative appointment of judges from the first day of substantive
discussions at the Convention, 4 is difficult to explain except on the
basis of the unexpected vote in favor of equal representation for
states in the Senate.
Acceptance of the advice and consent provision can also be
seen as a logical, strategic compromise that protected all states' in-
terests. Appointment by the Senate would have hurt large states
because it would have allowed small states, representing a minority
of the people, to dominate the process. Small states had sufficient
votes to win equal representation in the Senate, but they still could
not risk alienating and driving away the three largest states that
between them comprised nearly half of the union's population.
7 5
Thus, the smaller states may have felt it imprudent to hold out for
Senate appointment.
Still, the power that large states had to elect their favorite
sons as Presidents forced the small states to fight for some mean-
ingful Senate participation so that candidates from their states
would receive a fair share of appointments.7 Further, all the
states, interested in protecting their sovereignty, feared leaving ap-
pointments solely to the President, who, unlike a senator, was
elected only indirectly through the Electoral College and thus was
less accountable to state legislatures.77
B. Operation of Advice and Consent in Theory
Gouverneur Morris summed up the theory behind the advice
and consent system this way: "as the President was to nominate,
72 Id at 43.
73 Id at 81.
7" 1 Farrand at 21.
75 Using the representation in the First Congress's House of Representatives as an ap-
proximation of population, Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania had 40-45% of the
national population (26 votes), slightly more than the six states that voted for Senate ap-
pointment (25 votes). US Const, Art I, § 2, cl 3. For the population figures on which the
allocation of representatives was based, see 1 Farrand at 572-74. While the numbers do not
accurately reflect population because slaves were discounted, they provide a rough gauge of
the relative political strengths of the states.
76 3 Farrand at 99 (letter of Ellsworth and Sherman) and at 348-49 (statement of Davie
in the North Carolina convention); Myers v United States, 272 U.S. 52, 119-20 (1926). Mar-
tin stated a similar concern when addressing the Maryland General Assembly. See Herbert
J. Storing, ed, 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist 31 (Chicago, 1981).
" 3 Farrand at 357 (Sherman) (cited in note 15).
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there would be responsibility, and as the Senate was to concur,
there would be security.""8 These respective features of each
branch's participation tell much about their intended roles in the
appointment process. First, the nomination power must be left ex-
clusively to the President, or else responsibility will be diluted.
Second, the Senate must consider more than simply a nominee's
basic, legal qualifications, or its check on the President will be
ineffective.
1. Presidential Responsibility.
Gorham, in proposing the advice and consent plan, empha-
sized that because the President alone would choose nominees, he
would be responsible for his choice and thus would feel a greater
sense of duty, unlike individual senators who could avoid account-
ability by blaming their colleagues for a poor choice. 9 Madison
made the same point in shifting his support from Senate appoint-
ment to a Senate veto plan, which was similar to Gorham's plan. 0
In The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton later emphasized that bet-
ter choices would result if the responsibility for a choice rested on
one person because a single person would have fewer personal at-
tachments to gratify and the responsibility would "beget a livelier
sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation."8' Others,
including anti-Federalists Jefferson and Mason, agreed that the
Senate had no role in the nomination process under the advice and
consent plan.82 This interpretation is consistent not only with the
responsibility rationale, but with the text of the clause, in which
"nominate" is set off from "advice and consent."8 3
Some Framers felt that exclusive presidential nominating
power would be insufficient to preserve responsibility. Both John
Adams, who was not at the convention but who became a strong
critic of the Appointments Clause, and James Wilson complained
that "blending" the appointment power between the President and
the Senate would lessen the personal responsibility which would
bind the President to make good appointments. They reasoned
78 2 Farrand at 539.
79 Id at 41-43. See also id at 389 (G. Morris).
"0 Id at 80-81.
81 Federalist 76 (Hamilton) in The Federalist at 480, 481 (cited in note 41).
82 See Letter of Thomas Jefferson -o Col. Henry Lee (April 26, 1790), in Paul L. Ford,
ed, 5 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 162 (Knickerbocker, 1895); Letter of George Mason
to James Monroe (Jan 30, 1792), in 4 The Founders' Constitution at 110, 111 (cited in note
17); 3 Farrand at 162 (Wilson) (cited in note 15).
83 US Const, Art II, § 2, cl 2. See text accompanying notes 16-20.
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that under the adopted system the Senate's participation would
mute the blame for poor appointments. 4 Hamilton, however, ar-
gued persuasively that responsibility would be enhanced through
the Senate's participation:
It will readily be comprehended, that a man who had himself
the sole disposition of offices, would be governed much more
by his private inclinations and interests, than when he was
bound to submit the propriety of his choice to the discussion
and determination of a different and independent body...85
Hamilton's language suggests that, in order to make sure that the
President lives up to his constitutional responsibility, the Senate
must review the propriety of the presidential choice, not just the
basic qualifications of the nominee.
2. A Senatorial Check.
Some delegates felt that presidential responsibility would
prove illusory.8 6 Indeed, relying on personal responsibility alone to
protect against poor or politically motivated choices seems some-
what naive and contrary to the colonies' experience with England.
While Gorham asserted that the threat of public censure would re-
strain "honorable minds,187 Madison, who also had high hope for
the quality of leaders selected, recognized that "enlightened states-
men will not always be at the helm."88 Thus, the Framers fash-
ioned a system of checks and balances that set ambition against
ambition. 9 As Madison explained, "[a] dependence on the people
is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experi-
ence has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions." 90
Therefore, the Framers did not expect that responsibility in the
executive alone would solve the appointments problems.
The senatorial role provided security against "any flagrant
partiality or error."'" Gorham's analogy to the Massachusetts sys-
tem of appointments supports the view that he intended his advice
and consent plan to prevent abuse of power by the President.
When Gorham proposed the system, he observed that his state of
8, 4 Founders' Constitution at 106, 110 (cited in note 17).
Federalist 76 (Hamilton) in The Federalist at 480, 483 (cited in note 41).
88 2 Farrand at 43, 539 (Bedford, Gerry) (cited in note 15).
87 Id at 43.
88 Federalist 10 (Madison) in The Federalist at 129, 132 (cited in note 41).
89 Federalist 51 (Madison) in The Federalist at 355, 356.
90 Id.
81 2 Farrand at 80-81 (Madison) (cited in note 15).
[56:337
Supreme Court Appointments
Massachusetts had used "advice and consent" successfully.9 2 The
Massachusetts system was somewhat different from Gorham's
plan; the governor appointed judges "by and with the advice and
consent" of a council of nine senators chosen by the legislature.9
But according to the Address of the Convention of 1780, the sys-
tem was designed to prevent the abuse of power by the governor.9 4
The Senate's role as a check on presidential power emerged as
a theme during the ratification period. In The Federalist, Hamil-
ton contended that the "right of nomination would produce all the
good of that of appointment, and would in great measure avoid its
evils."9 5 He reasoned that the Senate's participation would be an
"excellent check on the spirit of favoritism in the President ..."96
Abraham Baldwin, also a signer of the Constitution, took a similar
view.9 7 Tench Coxe thought dividing the appointment power would
prevent patronage, influence, and judicial dependence on the Pres-
ident.9 8 The importance of a Senatorial check thus accepted, the
critical inquiry becomes how far the Senate may go in performing
this function.
C. Extent of the Senate's Review
Although there are some suggestions in the early history of the
national government that the Senate's role was only advisory, upon
examination it is clear that the Framers intended the Senate's
check to involve a vigorous review of judicial nominees. During the
92 Id at 41.
" Mass Const of 1780, 2d pt, ch II, § I, art IX; id at 2d pt, ch II, § III, art II.
4 Oscar and Mary Handlin, eds, The Popular Sources of Political Authority: Docu-
ments on the Massachusetts Constitution 438 (Harvard, 1966). Although one author refers
to the council as "an advisory body to the governor," Ronald M. Peters, Jr., The Massachu-
setts Constitution of 1780: A Social Compact 61 (U Mass, 1978), its advice must have
bound the governor, or it would not have been able to prevent abuse of power. Nevertheless,
Gorham did not elaborate on the kinds of abuse for which the Massachusetts system was
designed.
11 Federalist 77 (Hamilton) in The Federalist at 484, 486 (cited in note 41). Note that
because The Federalist was written to persuade the people of New York that the new Con-
stitution should be ratified, their theoretical discussions of checks and balances and separa-
tion of powers were frequently elevated above the practical political considerations that
largely influenced the delegates to the convention. Blumoff, 37 Syracuse L Rev at 1070
(cited in note 13). See also Geoffrey R. Stone, et al, Constitutional Law 7 (Little Brown,
1986).
" Federalist 76 (Hamilton) in The Federalist at 480, 483 (cited in note 41).
' 1 Annals of Congress 580 (Gales Seaton, 1834).
Tench Coxe, "An American Citizen" Essay I, in 13 Documentary History at 247, 250
(cited in note 32). Coxe's works on the Constitution circulated widely, and he corresponded
with Madison. John P. Kaminski and Gaspare J. Saladino, eds, 15 The Documentary His-
tory of the Ratification of the Constitution 453-54 (State Historical Society of Wis, 1984).
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First Congress, Madison claimed that the Constitution joined the
Senate with the President, "merely for the sake of advising, being
supposed, from their nature, better acquainted with the character
of the candidates than an individual."99 Fisher Ames, another
member of Congress, described the Senate as "merely an advisory
body."100 These statements should not be read as an endorsement
of limited senatorial review, however. Madison's statement directly
contradicts several speeches he gave at the Constitutional Conven-
tion, in which he stated that the Senate would check partiality and
error by the President. 101 Moreover, Madison made his "merely for
the state of advising" comment during a debate on removal power
for executive officers, not judges.0 2 Ames later qualified his com-
ment; he meant only to say that though the Senate must evaluate a
candidate, it cannot nominate one. 03
A merely advisory role would be inconsistent with the compro-
mise on the Appointments Clause reached in the last days of the
convention. Proponents of Senate appointment had the upper
hand because their plan won official approval in July by a 6-3
vote.'0 4 As discussed previously, there are many ways to explain
the compromise. Perhaps the small states became concerned that
the three states voting in the negative nearly outnumbered them in
population. Or perhaps the initiative on appointments was shifted
to the President in exchange for a great small state victory on the
election of the President. 10 5 Regardless of which motivation pre-
vailed, there is not even a hint that the compromise entailed a
drastically curtailed role for the Senate, except with respect to the
power to nominate. That opponents of Senate involvement vigor-
ously criticized the arrangement strongly suggests that the Senate
still had a meaningful role. 0 6
During the ratification debates many leaders spoke of the Sen-
11 3 Farrand at 357 (cited in note 15).
100 1 Annals of Cong at 561 (cited in note 97).
101 2 Farrand at 42-43, 80 (cited in note 15).
102 The rationale for using strict senatorial controls to ensure good appointments to an
independent, life-tenured branch of the government is less applicable to executive officials
who can be removed from office. Furthermore, during the Congressional debates on the re-
moval power, Madison had his own political aim, which was to insure that the President be
accorded the constitutional authority to remove officers in the executive branch. Thus, he
needed to show that preventing a removal infringes much more on the President's freedom
of choice than does rejecting a nomination.
103 1 Annals of Cong at 565 (cited in note 97).
10 2 Farrand at 72.
101 See Jillson, Constitution Making at 171 (cited in note 58).
10' See 4 Founders' Constitution at 106-107, 110 (Adams and Wilson) (cited in note
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ate's role in expansive terms. Hamilton stated that "[the Presi-
dent] was bound to submit the propriety of his choice to the dis-
cussion and determination of a different and independent
body . . . .",o Thomas Stone expressed a similar view in Con-
gress: "The President only nominates a person for [the Senate's]
consideration; they judge upon the propriety of the nomination."' 08
One author likened the President to no more than a nominating
member of the Senate, implying that executive and Senate should
use the same criteria to review nominees. 10 9 George Mason believed
that the Senate could interfere with everything but the nomina-
tion, implying that it could consider any factors, except a desire
that a particular person be nominated. 110 He feared, however, that
the Senate would play a largely passive role: "The false complai-
sance which usually prevails in such cases will prevent a disagree-
ment to the first nominations.""' On the other hand, the Federal
Farmer observed that "the presumption is, that the will of so im-
portant a body will not be very easily controulled, and that it will
exercise its powers with great address. 11 2 Elbridge Gerry, a dele-
gate to the Convention, also believed that the Senate's consent was
not "virtually given." ' 3
These arguments alone leave the Senate's role ambiguous. The
Senate was meant to look beyond basic qualifications, but the real
question is what factors the Framers expected and intended the
Senate to consider. Most importantly for the modern day, did the
Framers intend the Senate to consider a nominee's ideology and
101 Federalist 76 (Hamilton) in The Federalist at 480, 483 (cited in note 41). See Black,
79 Yale L J at 662 (cited in note 18) (arguing that Federalists 76 and 77 support Senate
consideration of a nominee's views of social justice). But compare William G. Ross, The
Functions, Roles, and Duties of the Senate in the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 28
Wm & Mary L Rev 633, 640 (1987) (Hamilton saw the Senate's role as limited to "checking
cronyism"); Kutner, 23 DePaul L Rev at 666 (cited in note 16) (Hamilton did not expect the
Senate to have much influence over appointments).
108 1 Annals of Cong at 587 (cited in note 97).
o9 William Findley ("Hampden"), Pittsburgh Gazette (Feb 16, 1788), in Merrill Jen-
sen, ed, 2 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 663, 667 (His-
torical Society of Wis, 1976).
110 4 The Founders' Constitution at 111 (cited in note 17).
1 2 Farrand at 83 (cited in note 15). See also id at 81 (Ellsworth).
12 Federal Farmer, Letter to the Republican (October 10, 1787), in John P. Kaminski
and Gaspare J. Saladino, eds, 14 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Con-
stitution 30, 33 (Historical Society of Wis, 1983). The works of the Federal Farmer are
generally attributed to R.H. Lee, but the accuracy of this is debatable. 14 Documentary
History at 15. The Federal Farmer has been called "the ablest and most influential of the
anti-federalist pamphleteers." Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Foun-
ders' Design, 54 U Chi L Rev 1484, 1493 (1987).
113 1 Annals of Cong at 556 (cited in note 97).
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political affiliation? For the answer to this question, we must look
beyond the vague concerns of intrigue and cabal and look into the
nature of the state interests that lay behind the Advice and Con-
sent Clause.
During the Convention and the ratification debates the poten-
tial importance of ideology went largely unaddressed. At the Con-
vention, only George Mason mentioned the possibility that the
President could use the nomination power to exert influence over
the judiciary, and he did not specifically address ideological influ-
ence." 4 Indeed, his view of this influence may have been quite nar-
row, since he did not see the potential for controversy in the courts
between North and South."' However, one writer did foresee and
approve of the Senate's rejection of a candidate based on ideologi-
cal grounds. Tench Coxe wrote that the Senate had a check on
"unwise or dangerous appointments."11 6 Writing as "A Freeman"
in 1788, he gave an example of what might constitute an unwise
appointment. He posed a hypothetical in which the Senate could
legitimately reject executive branch nominees for ideological
reasons:
Let us suppose an expedition on foot, which requires a num-
ber of general officers, whom a President might be inclined to
appoint from the state to which he belongs, or for which sev-
eral persons are nominated, that are too partially attached to
the federal government, or desirous of lessening the powers of
the separate states. The Senate can reject them all, and inde-
pendently give their reasons to the people and legislatures.
That they will often do so, we cannot doubt, when we remem-
ber where their private interests, affections and connexions
lie, to whom they will owe their seats-to whom they must
look for future favors of the same kind.""
This scenario is instructive because it takes the view that the
Senate can legitimately reject a presidential nominee because of
that nominee's political views, even if those political views have
114 2 Farrand at 83 (cited in note 15). Madison's notes do not indicate what sort of
influence Mason feared.
115 Id.
"I Coxe, "An American" Essay II, in 15 Documentary History at 165, 176 (emphasis
added) (cited in note 98).
7 Tench Coxe, "A Freeman" Essay Ill, Pennsylvania Gazette (February 6, 1788), in
John P. Kaminski and Gaspare J. Saladino, eds, 16 Documentary History 49, 51 (Historical
Society of Wis, 1986) (emphasis in original). Coxe sent a copy of this essay to Madison. 16
Documentary History at 49.
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little to do with the nominee's qualifications. While Coxe's hypo-
thetical does not specifically deal with judicial appointments, the
case for rejection is actually stronger for a Supreme Court Justice,
whose views are supposed to be independent of the President's. 118
One's stance on states' rights had little effect on one's qualifica-
tions as an expedition officer, but states' rights was a major politi-
cal issue of the day. Coxe thought that such blatant political bar-
gaining was acceptable.
Of course, Coxe's statements do not represent a consensus.
However, when we consider the role state rivalry played in the ap-
pointments debates, we see that by including the Senate at all, the
Framers tacitly endorsed ideological considerations. Equal state
representation meant that any inclusion of the Senate would nec-
essarily involve accommodating different views on states' rights,
and different views on states' rights represented political differ-
ences. The statements of delegates from the small states indicate
that they were concerned that appointees would only come from
the large states. Some might argue this concern was based only on
a desire for geographic diversity,1 9 but more lay behind small
states' motives than an interest in getting their fair share of ap-
pointments. Small states feared domination by the large states.
The conflict between large and small states is analogous to
modern disputes between political parties. At the time, there were
no national parties. Economic and social interests broke down
largely along state and regional lines.120 Slavery provides one ex-
ample. The southern states were deeply committed to preserving
slavery, while there was strong sentiment in the North for its re-
striction or abolition.121 However, the issue was negotiable:
"[Martin] found the eastern States, notwithstanding their
aversion to slavery were very willing to indulge the southern
States, at least with a temporary liberty to prosecute the
slave-trade, provided the southern States would, in turn, grat-
110 See Black, 79 Yale L J at 660 (cited in note 18).
11 Sherman suggested that appointments ought to be "diffused," thus possibly imply-
ing that geographical diversity was good for its own sake. 2 Farrand at 41 (cited in note 15);
see also id at 42 (Mason). George Washington based his nomination of James Iredell to the
Supreme Court in part on the fact that "he is of a State of some importance in the Union
that has given no character to a federal office." Abraham, Justices and Presidents at 79
(cited in note 2).
110 See McCoy, James Madison, in Beyond Confederation at 229, 239-40 (cited in note
55); Calvin C. Jillson, Constitution Making at 140-63 (cited in note 58).
I' Jillson, Constitution Making at 129, 140-41 (cited in note 58).
1989]
The University of Chicago Law Review
ify them, by laying no restriction on navigation acts...."2 2
Moreover, there was a division among the southern states on the
issue of the importation of slaves, Maryland and Virginia, each of
which had a surplus of slaves, split from South Carolina and Geor-
gia, which depended on continued imports.123
The slavery dispute shows that states with similar interests
functioned much like political parties. Different states organized
and voted in accordance with their collective interests and there
was bargaining and alignment among and between interest groups.
In the convention, the large states and the small states each tried
to work together as a group. After the Great Compromise, repre-
sentatives of the large states met to plot strategy. 124 Similarly, near
the end of the convention, Martin reports that members from the
small states began meeting in evening caucuses. 125
Thus, the significant evidence that the Framers intended the
Senate to play more than an advisory role, the recorded beliefs of
some that a legislative rejection for purely political reasons was ac-
ceptable, and the extent to which any Senatorial participation im-
plicitly acknowledged that it was important to include different
political viewpoints in the process, all argue in favor of a Senatorial
review power that includes evaluating a nominee's politics.
III. TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS: RUTLEDGE IN 1795
The political divisions at the Constitutional Convention fore-
shadowed the party disputes that resulted in the defeat of former
Supreme Court Justice John Rutledge for nomination to Chief Jus-
tice in 1795. The Rutledge nomination provides a particularly im-
portant opportunity to test the present interpretation of senatorial
review because six members of the Senate at that time had been
delegates to the convention.1 21
A. Background
The Jay Treaty, ratified in the summer of 1795, was negoti-
ated with Britain to minimize and obtain compensation for British
122 3 Farrand at 210-11, quoted in Jillson, Constitution Making at 146 (emphasis in
original).
123 Jillson, Constitution Making at 141, 144-145.
12, 2 Farrand at 19-20 (cited in note 15).
125 3 Farrand at 282.
228 The former delegates were Pierce Butler, Oliver Ellsworth, Rufus King, John Lang-
don, Alexander Martin, and Caleb Strong. See Biographical Directory of the American
Congress 1774-1971, 92nd Cong, 1st Sess 51-52 (GPO, 1971).
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interference with American shipping.12 7 The Republicans criticized
the concessions made by the United States, including a tacit ad-
mission of Britain's right to confiscate property aboard American
ships, because they viewed the United States as strong enough to
have exacted more demands from Britain.12 The Federalists, how-
ever, attached great importance to the treaty because they feared
that the Republican position would bring about a war with Britain
that would end American independence.2 9
The treaty was very unpopular throughout the nation. The
Federalists kept the terms of the treaty secret during the Senate's
deliberations and tried to keep them secret even after the treaty
was ratified by a vote of 20-10.130 When the terms of the treaty
were leaked to the public, "few people had even one word of de-
fense for the instrument.''3
In a speech in Charleston, John Rutledge joined others who
had publicly attacked the treaty.13 2 His speech came within days of
Rutledge's receipt of a recess appointment for Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court. 3 3 Because Washington's followers regarded sup-
port of the treaty as "the touchstone of true Federalism," they op-
posed the nomination despite Washington's support. 34
B. Rejection
The Federalists therefore set out to block Rutledge's confirma-
tion in the Senate. Rutledge had served on the Supreme Court
from 1789 to 1791, before resigning to become Chief Justice of the
South Carolina Supreme Court, so his qualifications were above
question. Still, the Senate rejected Rutledge by a vote of 14-10.' s1
The vote broke along party lines; only three Federalists voted to
12' Jerald A. Combs, The Jay Treaty: Political Battleground of the Founding Fathers
132-134, 151-153 (U Cal, 1970).
1 2 Id at 130, 153.
129 Id at 130-132.
130 Id at 161-162.
131 Id at 162.
132 Richard Barry, Mr. Rutledge of South Carolina 355-356 (Duell Sloan, 1942).
113 See Charles Warren, 1 The Supreme Court in United States History 127-128 (Little
Brown, 1924) (letter of Rutledge to Washington soliciting appointment); Barry, Mr. Rut-
ledge at 353 (cited in note 132). The vacancy resulted from John Jay's resignation.
12 Warren, 1 Supreme Court at 129 (cited in note 133).
Barry, Mr. Rutledge at 357-358 (cited in note 141). Barry erroneously states that
Luther Martin, George Mason, and George Read voted for Rutledge's confirmation. None of
the three served in the Senate. The confusion is probably due to the presence of Alexander
Martin, Stevens T. Mason and Jacob Read. See Biographical Directory at 51-52 (cited in
note 126).
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confirm Rutledge, while thirteen Federalists and only one anti-
Federalist voted to reject him.1 3 6
Hamilton, who had led the support of the Jay Treaty while
serving as Secretary of the Treasury, led the opposition to Rut-
ledge. 3 7 The northern Federalist newspapers also came out
strongly against the nomination, and caused further opposition to
Rutledge by publishing what Charles Warren described as "false
and exaggerated reports."' 3 Because of the unpopularity of the
Jay Treaty, Rutledge's opponents were wary of openly attacking
his views on the treaty. Instead, they charged that Rutledge's
mental abilities had deteriorated. The claim of mental unsound-
ness was based on two letters from bystanders who had heard Rut-
ledge's treaty speech and suggested that he sounded like a "crazy
man," and on the adjournment of a recent session of the South
Carolina court due to Rutledge's illness.'3 9
Analysis reveals the fabricated nature of the mental unsound-
ness claim. First, it is doubtful that Rutledge would have met
Washington's "stiff criteria" for service on the Court had he been
insane.14° Second, Rutledge's subsequent election to the South
Carolina assembly suggests that the voters trusted his compe-
tence.14 ' Third, Rutledge's performance as acting Chief Justice for
five months preceding his rejection evidenced no mental unsound-
ness. Finally, statements at the time strongly suggest that claims of
"insanity" were really based on Rutledge's treaty stand. For exam-
ple, Secretary of State Edmund Randolph wrote to President
Washington that: "The conduct of the intended Chief Justice is so
extraordinary that Mr. Wolcott and Col. Pickering conceive it to
be a proof of the imputation of insanity.' 1 42
Some contemporaries supported the Senate's rejection not be-
cause they thought Rutledge insane but because they considered
13' William F. Swindler, The Politics of "Advice and Consent", 56 ABA J 533, 535
(1970).
137 Barry, Mr. Rutledge at 355, 357 (cited in note 132).
138 Warren, 1 Supreme Court at 132 (cited in note 133). See also Abraham, Presidents
and Justices at 41 (cited in note 2); Harris, Advice and Consent at 43 (cited in note 5).
139 Barry, Mr Rutledge at 357-58 (cited in note 132). The Senate did not request or
receive any medical reports.
11 See Abraham, Justices and Presidents at 41 (cited in note 2). Washington adhered
strictly to six criteria: "(1) support and advocacy of the Constitution; (2) distinguished ser-
vice in the Revolution; (3) active participation in the political life of state or nation; (4)
prior judicial experience in lower tribunals; (5) either a 'favorable reputation with his fel-
lows' or personal ties with Washington himself; (6) geographical 'suitability.'" Id at 71-72.
1 Barry, Mr. Rutledge at 360-61 (cited in note 132).
12 Quoted in Warren, 1 Supreme Court at 130 (emphasis added) (cited in note 133).
[56:337
Supreme Court Appointments
his speech on the treaty hasty or imprudent, and thus not befitting
a Chief Justice of the United States.1 43 Hamilton encouraged this
view:
What are we to think of the state of the mind which could
produce such extravagant a folly? Would a prudent people
have been willing to have entrusted a negotiation which in-
volved their peace to the author of it? 44
Chauncey Goodrich attributed Washington's decision to nominate
Rutledge to "want of information of his hostility to the Govern-
ment. ' 145 However, that supporters of the treaty generally opposed
Rutledge, and opponents of it supported him, indicates that the
content of the speech more likely motivated the rejection. Thomas
Jefferson, who had led the opposition to the treaty, 46 saw through
this duplicity: "The rejection of Mr. Rutledge by the Senate is a
bold thing, because they cannot pretend any objection to him but
his disapprobation of the treaty.' '1 47
C. Legitimacy of the Rejection
The Senate rejected Rutledge primarily because of his opposi-
tion to the Jay Treaty, but this in itself does not indicate whether
the Framers considered such a rejection legitimate. Two pieces of
historical evidence suggest that the Framers may have considered
Rutledge's rejection illegitimate. First, there is Jefferson's state-
ment that the rejection based on politics was a "bold thing." Sec-
ond, the Federalists did not openly attack Rutledge's position on
the treaty but rather couched their opposition in the neutral terms
of mental competence. Upon closer examination, however, this evi-
dence becomes equivocal.
Significantly, Jefferson did not charge that the action violated
the Senate's constitutional role. He may have thought the rejection
"bold" not because of its unconstitutionality but because of the
widespread unpopularity of the treaty, which could have led to a
143 Id at 137.
14 Harold C. Syrett, ed, 19 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 91 (Columbia, 1973).
141 Quoted in Warren, 1 Supreme Court at 131-32 (cited in note 133).
146 Barry, Mr. Rutledge at 355 (cited in note 132).
147 Letter of Thomas Jefferson to William B. Giles (Dec 31, 1795), in Paul L. Ford, ed, 7
The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 41, 44 (Knickerbocker, 1896). Jefferson's position finds
widespread support among scholars. See, for example, Harris, Advice and Consent at 43
(cited in note 5); Harold C. Syrett, ed, 18 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 510-11, n 3
(Columbia, 1973); Warren, 1 Supreme Court at 137-39 (cited in note 133).
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backlash against the Senate.148 Rutledge's opponents most likely
hid the true grounds of their opposition not because those grounds
were illegitimate but because they were very unpopular. They
therefore concealed their true reasons for opposing Rutledge, just
as they tried, even after they had won ratification of the treaty, to
keep its terms secret.14 9 Both sides apparently accepted the consti-
tutionality of the Senate's action, despite the fact that the Senate's
objections were not based on the state interest and favoritism con-
cerns that were voiced at the convention.
IV. MODERN IMPLICATIONS OF THE APPOINTMENT DEBATE
The Framers anticipated that Supreme Court appointments
be subject to political scrutiny. The articulated concerns about pa-
tronage and corruption and the need to include different ideologi-
cal perspectives in the process are still valid today. However, mod-
ern critics of the system often suggest discounting the Framers'
intentions because: (1) the rise of parties has made the system
more political than the Framers expected or desired; (2) the pol-
itics of the process will obscure the merits of the nominee; and (3)
the greatly increased power of the modern Court makes public po-
litical battles over nominations less desirable. 150 These arguments
are suspect.
A. Political Parties
Many modern critics contend that the Framers were blind to
the impending rise in power of partisan political parties in Ameri-
can politics.' 5' One writer asserts that "[d]elegates simply as-
sumed, perhaps a mite naively, albeit quite understandably, that
those selected as federal jurists would be chosen on the basis of
merit. Period.' 52 With little analysis, these critics claim that only
John Adams foresaw that the rise of political parties would cause
partisan considerations, rather than the fitness of nominees, to
control nominations. 15 3 While it is true that organized parties were
18 See Combs, Jay Treaty at 152-53 (cited in note 127).
1 Id at 161-162.
See Abraham, Justices and Presidents at 26 (cited in note 2); Grossman and Washy,
1972 Duke L J at 561-562 (cited in note 4); Harris, Advice and Consent at 28 (cited in note
5); Robert B. McKay, Selection of United States Supreme Court Justices, 9 Kan L Rev
109, 129 (1960).
I1 Id.
152 Abraham, Justices and Presidents at 26 (cited in note 2).
l Harris, Advice and Consent at 34 (cited in note 5).
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still several years away in 1787, the partisan element that parties
inject into the process was familiar to the Framers. The Framers
were well aware of the dangers of factional politics, as is illustrated
by the system of checks and balances they put in place, their
knowledge of factional conflict in other nations, and their debates
in the Convention over intrigue and patronage. 1" The conflicts in
the Convention between large states and small ones, and between
nationalists and anti-Federalists, provide examples of alliances
that, while less permanent than modern political parties, had a
similar and powerful "politicizing" effect on the process.155
Madison anticipated religious and economic conflicts that were
every bit as divisive as abortion and affirmative action are today. 1 5
The crucial difference between the Framers' conception of faction,
as illustrated by Madison, and the modern party system is that
Madison saw much greater differences and much more potential
for serious conflict between factions. 57 The historical record at
that time was replete with factional conflicts leading nations into
bitter civil wars. 5 8 The relatively minor ideological differences that
characterize modern parties would seem to obstruct the process
much less than would the factions for which the system was
designed. The Framers would have been lacking in foresight in-
deed if the system of restraints designed to handle these greater
pressures were rendered obsolete when lesser pressures came from
formal parties.
B. Politics vs. Merit
During the ratification debates, John Adams charged that
"[flaction and Distraction are the sure and certain Consequence of
giving to a Senate a Vote in the distribution of offices."' 59 Hamil-
ton, expressing a similar concern, worried that if appointments
were left to the Senate, political dealing would obscure the merits
of the candidate.6 0 Some make this same argument against a vig-
154 See Benjamin F. Wright, Editor's Introduction, in The Federalist 1, 32-41 (cited in
note 41).
155 Consider, for example, that in the context of the Great Compromise, the large and
small states operated with more or less success as clearly defined coalitions. 2 Farrand at
17-20 (cited in note 15).
15' Wright, Editor's Introduction, in The Federalist at 39 (cited in note 41).
157 Id at 41.
158 Id.
159 Letter of John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (December 6, 1787), in 14 Documentary
History at 473 (cited in note 112).
160 Federalist 76 (Hamilton) in The Federalist at 480-82 (cited in note 41).
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orous Senate review today. However, these critics fail to note the
significance of the shared appointment power and fail to see that
limiting Senate review to basic qualifications would not cleanse the
process of partisan politics. As Hamilton observed in regard to re-
moval of judges for inability: "An attempt to fix the boundary be-
tween the regions of ability and inability, would much oftener give
scope to personal and party attachments and enmities than ad-
vance the interests of justice or the public good."'16'
Rather, Hamilton relied on a separation of powers and official
accountability in order to avoid excessive political strife. He felt
that the fact that the Senate could not choose candidates, and
therefore could not assure that subsequent candidates would be
more to their liking, prevented the Senate from rejecting a nomi-
nee except for good reason.'62 He also expected the public to cen-
sure the Senate if it rejected a good nominee, thus further discour-
aging the Senate from rejecting a nominee on partisan grounds. 6"
If Hamilton was right and it is impossible to filter out politics
from the review process, then it is certainly better not to force such
considerations into the back rooms, or not to couch them in ques-
tions of qualifications. If political dealing is inevitable, we should
recognize it as such or we will only further obscure the real issues.
To the extent that the actual reasons for the Senate rejecting a
nominee are obscured, the Framers' desire that people act as the
ultimate check is minimized.16 4
C. Power of the Supreme Court
Finally, some may charge that the Framers' intent regarding
judicial appointments is less useful today because of the greatly
increased power of the Supreme Court. However, the Court's rela-
tive power makes it more, not less, important that there be an ef-
fective check against influence over the judiciary. A more powerful
Court means that the stakes of an appointment are higher, so the
dangers attendant upon corruption and influence-peddling are
even greater.
More importantly, an effective check is needed because the
political interests that the Framers sought to recognize play a more
direct role in the work of the Supreme Court. While in 1787 some
Federalist 79 (Hamilton) in The Federalist at 497, 498.
182 Federalist 76 (Hamilton) in The Federalist at 480, 482-83.
103 Federalist 77 (Hamilton) in The Federalist at 484, 486.
Tench Coxe, "A Freeman" Essay III, in 16 Documentary History at 49, 51 (cited in
note 117).
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delegates failed to see a connection between the Court and impor-
tant political issues,165 today the relationship is undeniable. Given
the effect that modern Supreme Court appointments can have on
the Constitution itself, the Senate's check on presidential nomina-
tions is more valuable than ever. As Senator Edward Kennedy
noted: "On occasion, the appointment of a Justice has been the
equivalent of a constitutional amendment.1 66
A rigorous Senate review of nominees to the Supreme Court
does not upset the traditional constitutional balance and separa-
tion of powers; it strengthens it. The division of the appointment
power between the President and the Senate provides precautions
against abuse of power by either, and thereby protects the inde-
pendence of the Supreme Court. If either branch plays a submis-
sive role, the constitutional balance will be threatened.
V. CONCLUSION
As the Framers debated which branch of government could
best evaluate the qualifications of potential judges, they designed a
system that would minimize corruption and political dealing, while
at the same time take account of legitimate and inevitable political
interests. The specific ideological concerns have changed with time,
but the nature of the conflict has not. The rejection of John Rut-
ledge for the Supreme Court in 1795 supports the view that politi-
cally motivated votes are legitimate, if not desirable, under our
system of divided appointment power. The Framers realized that
politics would enter into the process, just as it had in the adoption
of the system during the summer of 1787. They realized that any
criteria they set out for judges could be manipulated by opposing
political forces. Therefore, they devised a system that set "ambi-
tion against ambition," believing that corruption would be mini-
mized, political forces would balance each other out and worthy
candidates would be approved.
1'" See, for example, 2 Farrand at 83 (cited in note 15) (Mason denied any connection
between the courts and the conflict between North and South).
"' Symposium on Advice and Consent on Supreme Court Nominations, Subcommittee
on Separation of Powers, Senate Judiciary Committee, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 2 (1976) (intro-
ductory statement of Senator Edward M. Kennedy).
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